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Export Control Proliferation:  
The Effects of United States Governmental 
Export Control Regulations on Small 
Businesses—Requisite Market Share Loss; 
A Remodeling Approach 
Jared A. Borocz-Cohen* 
Made in the USA. This phrase, stamped on the bottom of many 
domestic items, is becoming increasingly difficult to find abroad. 
The United States government, of course, regulates almost every 
good manufactured in America. The obvious federal regulations 
encompass topics such as, but not limited to, consumer safety, 
durability, and warranty. However, perhaps the most important 
of these regulations are those aimed at national security. 
Federal regulations concerning national security is the junction 
at which export controls come into play. The central goal of 
export controls in the United States, and globally, is to promote 
security. The main issue this raises for businesses–especially 
smaller manufacturing businesses–is that, in the process of 
compliance with national security protocols, business 
productivity may be adversely affected. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The primary task of this Comment is to give an overview of the 
export control regime that affects most small businesses in the exporting 
industry. This Comment will highlight some of the most important 
challenges that small businesses are facing when striving to export those 
goods deemed “dual-use.” The term dual-use encompasses goods that 
can be used both for civilian and weapons purposes. While this may 
sound less than sinister for most small business, when delving deeper 
into the degree of federal regulation employed, the effects thereof can be 
widespread. Many items that most Americans use every day–such as 
computers, navigation devices, smartphones, and gaming consoles–are 
actually regulated by stringent export controls. The task for small 
businesses that produce items such as microchips, radio devices, 
computers, and navigation equipment, is one of navigation and expertise. 
II. EXPORT CONTROLS IN GENERAL 
Whether a shipment requires an export license depends on a 
multitude of factors: what is the actual item being shipped, where it is 
going, who is the end-user, and for what purposes will the end-user be 
utilizing the shipment.1 The control lists, which will be discussed in the 
                                                                                                             
1 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, KNOW THE FACTS BEFORE YOU SHIP: A GUIDE TO 
EXPORTING LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 2. 
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proceeding section of this Comment, only encompass the items 
controlled. The item may, however, be controlled to certain destinations 
and not others.2 An item is considered a “controlled” good when it 
requires a license to export from the United States to a foreign country.3 
Items shipped to many embargoed countries are controlled, but those 
same items may be shipped without a license to a range of other, non-
embargoed countries.4 For example, a corporation is required to apply 
for an export license from the Department of Commerce for goods 
deemed “EAR99” being shipped to embargoed countries,5 such as Iran,6 
Cuba7 and Syria.8 “EAR99 items generally consist of low-technology9 
consumer goods”10 that would not normally require a shipping license.11 
Additionally, any materials on the ITAR control list are prohibited from 
being shipped to multiple other restricted states around the world.12 
Various other items most likely require an export license as well, even 
for EAR99 goods,13 as these countries are embargoed countries. 
In order to know if an item is controlled, each exporter must know 
the item’s Export Control Classification Number (ECCN).14 This 
                                                                                                             
2 Id. at 2-3. 
3 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCE DEPARTMENT EXPORT 
CONTROLS 2. 
4 Id. 
5 See Commerce Control List, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/regulations/commerce-control-list-ccl (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2014). 
6 31 C.F.R. Part 560. 
7 31 C.F.R. part 515. 
8 31 C.F.R. part 542; see also Jeffery A. Van Detta, Politics and Legal Regulation in 
the International Business Environment: An FDI Case Study of Alstom, S.A., in Israel, 21 
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 92 (2013). 
9 Low-technology consumer goods consist of general household goods, such as 
pencils, pens, jewelry, and pharmaceuticals. 
10 Kimberly Orr & Betty Lee, Demystifying Department of Commerce Export Controls 
for the Biosafety Professional 14 Applied Biosafety 70 (2009). 
11 Id. 
12 Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Updates to Country 
Policies, and Other Changes, 76 Fed. Reg. 152 (August 8, 2011) (to be codified at 22 
CFR part 126). Other embargoed countries include: Libya, Lebanon, Somalia, Belarus, 
Sudan, North Korea, Iraq, Yemen, Myanmar (formerly Burma), Liberia, Zimbabwe, 
Balkans, the Cote D’Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast). 
13 Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (2006); see also Export 
Controlled or Embargoed Countries, Entities and Persons, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 
DORESEARCH, https://doresearch.stanford.edu/research-scholarship/export-controls
/export-controlled-or-embargoed-countries-entities-and-persons (last visited Oct. 6, 
2014). 
14 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 3. 
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identifier tells the exporter from which shipment destinations the item is 
prohibited and whether such shipments require a validated license.15 
It is imperative that each export company understands the regulations 
in place. A better understanding of each regulation affecting one’s 
business directly translates to a more efficient and competitive business. 
Large companies seemingly already dominate the export market for 
electronics and other technology products, which places smaller trade 
businesses at a disadvantage. Further, export controls add an additional 
layer of separation in the competition for market share as larger 
businesses, which designate teams of experts to work on compliance 
issues, are inherently better equipped to handle these export controls.16 
In order for small businesses to have a fighting chance in this already 
barren market, understanding the existing regulations is key. Small 
businesses must prepare for and adapt their policies and procedures to 
any new regulations. Such compliance is perhaps their best chance at 
competing in the market as a better and quicker understanding of these 
regulations allows for more streamlined exports. This is not to say, 
however, that the regulations are easily understood and adaptable. 
There are a vast amount of regulations on businesses of all sizes that 
are expensive and unnecessarily burdensome. This Comment strives to 
highlight the issues with regards to the United States’ export control 
regime, eliminate the cons already in place, and make suggestions for 
future alterations to the regulatory regime. 
III. INTRODUCTION TO EXPORT CONTROLS (U.S.) 
The production of hazardous materials for both civilian and military 
purposes has led the United States government to establish its own list of 
controls–for example the Department of Commerce’s Implementation of 
the Wassenaar plenary agreements17–in order to curb the proliferation of 
potentially risky materials falling into the wrong hands,18 a relatively 
new concern in this age of international terrorism.  Following the 
devastating attacks of September 11, 2011 on domestic soil, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security significantly 
                                                                                                             
15 Id. 
16 COAL. FOR SEC. & COMPETITIVENESS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A 21ST CENTURY 
TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (2010). 
17 Department of Commerce, Wassenaar Arrangement 2013 Plenary Agreements 
Implementation: Commerce List, Definitions, and Reports; and Extension of Fly-by-Wire 
Technology and Software Controls, 79 Fed. Reg. 149 (August 4, 2014) (to be codified at 
15 C.F.R. 734). 
18 Regulations, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://www.bis.
doc.gov/index.php/regulations (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
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revamped its export control regime. The sections that were subsequently 
revamped apply to export licensing, control lists, brokering regimes, and 
sanctions.19 
Currently, the United States government has three primary licensing 
departments with subsidiary agencies that work with companies 
exporting potentially sensitive armaments and dual-use items and 
technology outside of the U.S. borders: the Departments of Commerce, 
State, and Treasury.20 The involvement of so many government entities 
can prove overwhelming and confusing for small businesses trying to 
export their goods. As a result, the U.S. government is pursuing 
alternative means to achieve a more streamlined and liberalized process 
of licensing, pushing for a Single Licensing Agency, which would act as 
a “one-stop shop” for businesses pursuing export licenses.21 Further, the 
U.S. government strives to achieve these goals through: enforcement, 
coordination, and end-use agreements.22 
A. Regulations 
The problematic issue for small business lies in the vast amount of 
U.S. export control legislation and governing authorities.23 The main law 
governing export controls is the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),24 
which set forth the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that 
have been implemented by the Department of State25 The AECA deals 
primarily with defense-related goods. Thus, any business desiring the 
                                                                                                             
19 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-234, DEFENSE TRADE: ARMS EXPORT 
CONTROL SYSTEM IN THE POST-9/11 ENVIRONMENT (2005) (Report to the Chairman, 
Committee on International relations, House of Representatives) [hereinafter U.S. GAO]. 
20 Overview of U.S. Export Control System, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov
/strategictrade/overview/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Export Control]. 
21 Id. 
22 The U.S. government bases its export control regime on four outlying principles. 
First, the U.S. government has a broad national commitment to the regime. The U.S. 
follows each multilateral export control regime to the letter by incorporating each and 
every controlled item on those lists into the US list, and even adds more of its own 
regulations for added security. Second, the U.S. establishes authority to control dual-use 
goods through: comprehensive controls, enforcement, directives, and interagency 
coordination. Third, it establishes clear modes of authority and a control list. Fourth, the 
U.S. government focuses on preventative enforcement such as: end-use agreements, 
screening, and educating the market. See Overview of U.S. Export Control System, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) 
[hereinafter U.S. Export Control]. 
23 See infra Section IV. 
24 Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2780(d) (2013). 
25 Id. 
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manufacture and exportation of goods used for defense purposes will 
have to meet the Act’s strict licensing criteria.26 
Many small businesses are also affected by the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (“EAA”),27 which established the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR) coordinated by the Department of 
Commerce.28 This Act controls software and other technology related 
dual-use items. The Treasury, mentioned briefly here for completeness 
but not in the scope of this Comment, deals mainly with sanctions 
relating to embargoed countries and fines for violations of export 
controls.29 
B. Control Lists 
The U.S. government implements all of the multilateral export 
control regime regulations,30 in addition to various unilateral measures 
for state security in the form of three main control lists. First, the 
Commerce Control List (CCL)31 includes each item on the Wassenaar 
Arrangement Dual-Use List,32 all items on the other three control lists, 
and then also various additional items that the United States deems as 
security risks.33 The CCL is organized numerically, with each number, 0-
9, corresponding to a different area of product control.34 The larger the 
number, the more controlled the substance35 
The other two control lists are the U.S. Munitions List36 and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Controls.37 Because these lists affect a 
smaller portion of the businesses discussed previously, this Comment 
will mainly focus on the previous lists, primarily the CCL. 
                                                                                                             
26 Id. 
27 Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 50 U.S.C. App. 2403(e). 
28 Id. 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
30 Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Updates to Country 
Policies, and Other Changes, 76 Fed. Reg. 152 (August 8, 2011) (to be codified at 22 
CFR part 126). 
31 Commerce Control List, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/regulations/commerce-control-list-ccl (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2014). 
32 See infra Section IV. 
33 Wassenaar Arrangement Introduction, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.
wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
34 Id.; see infra Figure I. 
35 Wassenaar Arrangement Introduction, supra note 33. 
36 United States Munitions List, 22 CFR Ch. 1 (4-1-13 Edition). 
37 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR 37; Security Orders and Requirements, 
U.S. NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/security/byproduct/orders.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
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C. Licensing 
Companies desiring to export any item on the aforementioned lists 
must submit a license request with the qualifying agency. These license 
requests may ultimately be reviewed by five different agencies.38 The 
process to determine whether to approve a license includes a review of 
the applicant, all parties to the transaction, and quantity and quality of 
export, including end-use agreements, national security concerns, and 
international concerns.39 These government entities receive a vast 
amount of licensing requests, with the Office of Defense Trade Controls 
and the Department of Commerce receiving some 55,000 and 12,000, 
respectively, per year.40 
IV. INTRODUCTION TO MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL 
REGIME 
Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECR) are international 
bodies that govern the export and licensing of potentially high risk and 
hazardous materials.41 While there are various types export control 
regimes, such as those for hazardous waste, there are four particular 
international regimes, governing the export of controlled materials, 
equipment, and technology for defense-related purposes, which are 
applicable herein: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the 
Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.42 
a. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a 
multinational body consisting of 49 member states that 
controls the export of nuclear related technology.43 
b. The Australia Group (AG) is an informal 
collection of 42 member states that controls the export of 
chemical and biological technology that has the potential 
to be weaponized.44 
                                                                                                             
38 U.S. Export Control, supra note 20. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See Multilateral Export Control Regimes, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/multilateral-export-
control-regimes (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
42 See id. 
43 Organisation, NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en
/organisation-information (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
44 THE AUSTRALIA GROUP, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2014). 
232 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:225 
 
c. The Missile Technology Control Regime is 
likewise an informal collection of states that seeks to 
control rockets and other aerial vehicles capable of 
delivering weapons of mass destruction.45 
d. The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is a 
MECR consisting of 41 participating states designed to 
control the exportation of various dual-use goods and 
technologies.46 This MECR will be the focus of this 
article, detailing the actual controlled items, and the 
effect on businesses with regards to exporting the 
respective item. (The WA is the crux of this Comment’s 
purpose). 
V. WASSENAAR AND DUAL-USE GOODS 
The ultimate goal of the WA is “to contribute to regional 
and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and 
greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-
use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing 
accumulations.”47 The WA’s primary purpose is to establish a control list 
for recommendation to all countries around the world.48 
A. Control List 
The WA list of restricted items is broken into two categories: Dual-
Use Goods and Technologies (Basic List), and the Munitions List.49 This 
Comment does not concern the latter, focusing instead on the list of 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The Basic List, which is nearly 
identical to the control list espoused by the U.S. government,50 comprises 
of ten categories of goods, organized in increasing levels of 
sophistication. 
                                                                                                             
45 The Missile Technology Control Regimes at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, http://
www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr (last updated Dec. 2012). 
46 Wassenaar Arrangement Introduction, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.
wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Control Lists – Current, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.wassenaar.org
/controllists/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Wassenaar Arrangement 
Control Lists]. 
50 See infra Figure 1. 
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Figure I: Dual-Use Goods and Technologies51 
Category 0 Special Materials and Related Equipment 
Category 1 Materials Processing 
Category 2 Electronics 
Category 3 Computers 
Category 4 Part 1 – Telecommunications 
Category 5 Part 2 – “Information Security” 
Category 6 Sensors and “Lasers” 
Category 7 Navigation and Avionics 
Category 8 Marine 
Category 9 Aerospace and Propulsion 
 
VI. INTERACTION OF DUAL-USE GOODS AND SMALL BUSINESS 
The main issue that most small businesses face is one of 
understanding exactly which shipped items are covered by federal 
regulation. Small businesses in this field frequently lack the expertise 
necessary to thrive due to the pervasiveness of burdensome regulations 
and 52 control lists.53 Due to governmental administrative inefficiencies, 
this Comment believes it logically follows that many companies have 
difficulties ascertaining which federal agency is regulating a certain 
product.54 As a result of the vast overlap in dual-use and defense-related 
goods, many items may be subject to either ITAR or EAR,55 depending 
on the item’s classification.56 Examples of issues that have been subject 
to overlapping control include: public domain, defense services, 
fundamental research and technical data definitions.57 
A. Navigation Issues 
As these lists are not streamlined, navigating them requires extreme 
specificity and knowledge of each individual product, down to its 
                                                                                                             
51 Id. 
52 NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, 2013 SMALL BUSINESS EXPORTING 
SURVEY 3 (2013). 
53 See 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2012) (stating that EAR is applicable to “dual-use” 
items); 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (2011) (showing that ITAR is applicable to defense services 
and articles). 
54 Consent Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov
/compliance/consent_agreements.html (last updated June 18, 2014). 
55 Items may include technical data, diagrams, models, and engineering designs. 
56 15 C.F.R. § 730.3. 
57 DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, NOV. 2012 PRIORITIES LIST, available 
at http://pmddtc.state.gov/dtag/documents/plenary_Nov2012_Priorities.pdf. 
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component makeup.58 Many companies need to submit queries into 
exactly what components are regulated by which departments, and often 
are subjected to a significant time waiting period simply receive an 
answer—not to mention the wait period for being approved for the 
particular license.59 With various agencies taking on the decision-making 
role and, sometimes representing competing interests, the tribulations for 
small businesses are quite clear.60 
These issues are further underscored when looking at the myriad of 
departments that regulate goods: Departments of Defense, State, 
Commerce, Homeland Security, the Treasury, Energy, and Justice. 
Coordination among these departments is lackluster to say the least.61 
B. Multi-Agency Interaction Delays 
The setbacks for small businesses are even more evident when 
comparing the interactions between the two main regulatory agencies, 
the Department of State, for weapons-related material62, and the 
Department of Commerce, for dual-use items.63 In most instances, the 
Commerce list is much less restrictive than the list produced by State.64 
Thus, determining which items are controlled by each list is a 
fundamental concern for companies in the business of exporting. 
However, the departments have disagreed in the past, sometimes 
claiming jurisdiction of identical items.65 
This Comment posits that a competing business can seemingly 
choose which system to apply to–the State list or the Commerce list—
based on which is the less restrictive list.66 Herein lies the problem.67 
Small businesses with less experienced export track records will 
invariably be disadvantaged to the larger businesses that can exploit 
these systemic flaws—thus creating an uneven playing field for the small 
business producers. 
                                                                                                             
58 Id. 
59 U.S. GAO, supra note 19, at 2. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 31. 
62 Id. at 32. 
63 Id. at 36. 
64 Id. at 37. 
65 Export Control List Review and Creating A Single Control List, EXPORT.GOV, http://
export.gov/ecr/eg_main_027617.asp, (Last visited on Oct. 6, 2014). 
66 Businesses can, in essence, chose the department that reviews their lists by 
submitting a request to the department or agency it wishes to use—this only applies when 
there is overlap in agency or department licensing. 
67 Id. 
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Licensing is another issue borne of these multi-agency and inter-
agency deficiencies.68 Licenses, prior to 2003, were usually granted 
within 13 days. As of 2006, the licensing time had doubled; pushing a 
26-day turn-around.69 These extra two weeks could easily cost businesses 
valuable opportunities as competitive businesses position their goods to 
be rapidly shipped across the global daily. Continuing in this vein, the 
turnaround time listed above does not even take into account backlogs in 
each department’s review process.70 In Fiscal Year 2006, the backlog of 
State Department license applications reached a peak of 10,000 cases.71 
C. New Changes as of October 15th, 2013 
On October 15th, 2013, the U.S. government began implementing 
new regulations and reforms on the export control arena that even further 
undermined business productivity.72 The U.S. government has begun to 
incorporate the new 600-series export control classification lists,73,which 
are designed to distinguish those items that are “critical to maintaining a 
military or intelligence advantage to the United States” (i.e., military 
items) and those that necessitate a more flexible control program.74 The 
                                                                                                             
68 Id. 
69 U.S. GAO, supra note 19, at 2. 
70 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-767T, EXPORT CONTROLS: 
FUNDAMENTAL REEXAMINATION OF SYSTEM IS NEEDED TO HELP PROTECT CRITICAL 
TECHNOLOGIES: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND 
INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
STATEMENT OF ANNE-MARIE LASOWSKI, DIRECTOR ACQUISITION AND SOURCING 
MANAGEMENT 2-3 (2009); see also Nadine Tushe, Export Controls: Do They Undermine 
the Competitiveness of U.S. Companies in the Transatlantic Defense Market, 41 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 57, 62 (2011). 
71 Id. 
72 CCL Based Controls, National Security 15 C.F.R. §742.4(b)(ii)(2014); see also 
Export Control Reform—New Order of Review and the “600 Series,” BIS.GOV, available 
at http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/789-600-series-and-ccl-
order-of-review; Nicholas A. Rosenberg, The 600 Series: As part of Export Control 
Reform, the U.S. government shifts former Munitions List items to a new category on the 
Commerce Control List, Nixon Peabody, http://www.nixonpeabody.com/US_
government_shifts_former_Munitions_List_items. 
73 Id. 
74 Eric L. Hirschorn, Remarks of Under Secretary Eric L. Hirschorn at the Export 
Control Reform Workshop, Colorado Springs, CO, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. 
Dep’t of Commerce (May 19, 2014); see also Lindsay A. Meyer et al., United States: 
October 15th Export Control Reform Changes Are Around the Corner: Take Time Now 
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program claims its main goal is to facilitate and encourage exports to 
U.S. allies.75 This Comment views these regulations as a double-edged 
sword, trying to help, but possibly hindering, the smaller and less-savvy 
exporters. 
The new 600-series has altered the makeup of the existing control 
lists by transferring many items covered by ITAR and the Defense 
Department to the CLL, under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Commerce.76 As aforementioned, the Commerce list is less restrictive. 
Thus, these recent regulations can aid businesses that export the 
transferred goods. 
The main issue for small-businesses, however, is implementation and 
industry understanding of the necessary license.77 With these new 
regulations taking effect only months ago, businesses will still be 
applying for licenses under ITAR. The Defense Department must then 
return this request, forcing resubmission through Commerce—wasting 
time and valuable expenses on the company’s part.78 One saving grace of 
these regulations, however, allows for the existing license, within two 
years of the series’ implementation, to be carried out until its expiration 
for the requisite department.79 
1. Subparagraph Provisions 
The new regulations do not stop with the item transfers. One of the 
most important features of the new 600-series is the subparagraph 
provision, designed to alter the replaced regulations,80 which basically 
brought certain items under the control of ITAR.81 Presently, the new 
rules designate a “catch and release” provision which, according to the 
series’ creators, was adopted because the agencies found that it would be 
easier to explain what the term did not or should not encompass as 
opposed to what it actually includes.82 Businesses must thus examine and 
possibly reclassify certain exports to match this definition.83 
                                                                                                             
75 Hirschorn, supra note 74. 
76 CCL Based Controls, supra note 72; see e.g., Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 
Airplanes, 78 Fed. Reg. 22431, 22432 (April 16, 2013) (to be codified at 14 CFR Part 
39).  
77 Meyer, supra note 74. 
78 Export Control Reform, supra note 72. 
79 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, EXPORT CONTROL 




82 Id.; Meyer, supra note 74. 
83 Id. 
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The new program creates a catch and release program, with 
subparagraph “A” catching multiple goods, but subparagraph “B” 
releasing these goods.84 Understanding these new provisions and 
classifying goods accordingly is a very important task for exporters. The 
problem with the catch and release program for small businesses lies in 
the ability to understand these new rules and designate the goods 
accordingly. This is a major step in becoming competitively viable in the 
larger export market. As of now, while the smaller businesses try to 
incorporate and understand the new provisions, larger, more 
sophisticated businesses may leave the smaller ones in the dust. 
2. Benefits 
This is not to say, however, that the new regulations are completely 
detrimental to small business owners. There are many benefits to such 
individuals of the new regulations, which should inform the existing 
regulations on export controls. If the present regulations could 
incorporate the positive features of these new 600-series regulations, the 
result would be a more streamlined and user-friendly approach for small 
businesses. 
First, the migration feature permits goods that were previously 
controlled by ITAR and now controlled by CCL, to operate under a 
single license requirement85 by amending the existing rules to eliminate 
the need for multiple licenses.86 
Second, the new provisions also aid companies desiring to 
concurrently ship multiple items that are controlled by different 
departments.87 The company must simply apply for licenses for all of the 
goods to the requisite agency.88 For example, if a company needs to ship 
items controlled by both ITAR and CCL, they may ship both goods 
together under one license. 
VII. OVERLAP ANALYSIS (DUAL-USE AND SMALL BUSINESS) 
The interaction between dual-use regulations and business 
competitiveness seem to have become increasingly interwoven in recent 
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decades. Businesses are frequently at the mercy of the licensing 
departments when waiting for licenses to be processed.89 Many domestic 
businesses lament that these regulations hinder their competitive 
advantages in the global market.90 For example, K & F Electronics, a 
small circuit board producer based out of Detroit, had professed a serious 
loss of profits due to confusion in the licensing market.91 It has seen 
multiple requests for identical items rejected at times and at other times 
granted.92 The uneven application of controls is clearly hurting small 
businesses like K & F, which also expressed difficultly in identifying 
which parts of its circuits require which licenses—Commerce or State.93 
Further, because of the fact that circuit boards may actually be regulated 
by the State Department, K & F must obtain explicit authorization to 
export products falling under ITAR.94 Considering identical items have 
been stamped ITAR and non-ITAR upon license request, the problems 
confounding small businesses alike are evident.95 
A. U.S. Market Share Issues 
Many foreign companies actually avoid U.S. companies when 
searching for products due to the increasingly strict export regulations.96 
One such domestic company described issues with French and British 
customers, stating that those customers “will always buy a non-U.S. 
sourced part even for substantially more money to avoid [the] EAR and 
especially ITAR.”97 Some multinational companies, most notably Thales 
Alenia Space,98 have also adopted this buying philosophy by adopting an 
“ITAR-Free” unofficial trade practice.99 
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Further, in a 2006 accompanying report to a UK survey to evaluate 
British-based companies’ attitudes towards controlled American 
electronics and technologies, British companies were found to be 
increasingly adopting “an unofficial and unstated ‘Buy American Last’ 
policy due to unsatisfactory experiences with U.S. export control 
bureaucracy.”100 
American-based companies are clearly suffering a competitive 
disadvantage as a result of these issues. Larger American businesses are 
able to traverse these issues by purchasing products on a larger scale,101 
which can be more appealing to foreign customers as only one license 
must be procured for the same product, thusly offsetting the underlying 
export control disadvantages.102. Further, these larger companies’ 
expertise in the field also aids in their global dominance and sales.103 
Smaller companies, however, are unable to compete with their larger 
counterparts’ ability to lower prices by mass production. In the end, 
however, the export and technology industry will suffer as such lower-
tier companies are often the “source of much innovation [and are] 
normally the most engaged in the global market place in the 
aerospace/defense sector.”104 
B. Competitive Market Loss 
The problem highlighted above is compounded by the fact that these 
countries can find the goods elsewhere with little export control 
hassle.105 Even if U.S. exporters have the ability and requisite licenses to 
ship items abroad, the time and hassle of waiting for an export license 
may drive many buyers to seek alternative sources, with much fewer 
limitations on the exact items.106 
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This idea is illustrated by a recent market loss example in which a 
U.S. company lost business and market share as a result to unnecessary 
export controls.107 The shipment of krypton electric switches (used by 
doctors to breakup kidney stones, but also listed as dual-use on the CCL 
because the part can be used as a component of a nuclear launcher) is 
prohibited for sale in varying countries in the Middle East, including 
Iraq.108 Siemens Corporation, a German company, filled in the gaps and 
provided these goods to various Iraqi hospitals.109 
This Comment proposes that it may seem troublesome to many 
Americans to sell anything to Iraq, let alone items capable of aiding in 
the development of a nuclear launcher considering the instability of the 
region. But, taking a step back, it becomes clear that these regulations do 
not harm the targeted countries but rather the U.S. companies who might 
otherwise export goods to sanctioned nations. Germany, a leading power 
in the international economic market, seemingly does think the dangers 
outweigh the benefits with regards to shipping such goods to Iraq; France 
has equally engaged in this balancing test and deemed it appropriate to 
shipping like goods to Iraq.110 In fact, following the U.S.’s successful 
toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, American forces found a 
multitude of goods, restricted for sale on the U.S. control list, in Iraq that 
were supplied by German and French companies in compliance with 
European export control laws.111 
These hospitals had valid licenses and end-user agreements112; 
however, because of over-inclusive U.S. export controls that precluded 
American firms from conducting business with these hospitals, U.S. 
companies lost business opportunities and, more importantly, global 
market share. It may seem that with an increased proliferation of such 
materials, the likelihood of said materials falling into the wrong hands 
increases. However, what stops German or French companies from 
simply sending more of these items? What stops German companies 
from producing a few extra switches a year that might otherwise be 
supplied by American companies, if the U.S.’s stringent export controls 
were to be loosened? The threat of proliferation already exists as a result 
of the actions taken by other companies. Hence, concerning items that 
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are less than sinister, these unwieldy regulations on domestic firms 
necessitate change. 
The Secretary of State is permitted to make a discretionary decision 
to approve all licenses for good that meet licensing requirements113 
where he or she can determine that an export control is ineffective due to 
the availability of the same item in non-U.S. markets.114 Additionally, the 
Secretary may remove the items from the CLL if he or she deems it to be 
the appropriate action.115 
It seems, at least intuitively, to be a perfect and foolproof system. If 
the United States sees other goods being exported by foreign companies 
in compliance with the host country’s requisite export laws, then the U.S. 
should not fear exporting those items as, theoretically, such controlled 
items are already available in the world market. It logically follows that 
these items––controlled, of course, by the WAWA–are relatively safe for 
exportation,116,and may be consequentially removed from the export 
control list. Therefore, any item that remains on the U.S. control list is 
deemed hazardous and not exported by any other countries.117 This 
premise, in theory, seems ideal. The logical question that follows, 
however, is what is the point of the U.S. having a CCL or a regulatory 
list of its own at all? Why not just use the Wassenaar List in its entirety? 
The “ideal” scenario presented above is far from present in the U.S. 
control regime. There are numerous specifications on the U.S. control 
lists not on the Wassenaar List, and thus not on many of the leading 
exporting countries’ lists, either.118 The U.S. prohibits exports of 
controlled items to certain countries altogether, regardless of export 
licenses.119 This demonstrates that the U.S. export controls are vastly 
over-inclusive: these regulations encompass any variety of items that are 
either not controlled or are nominally controlled by a multitude of 
countries, and hampers the sale of those items abroad. In the end, U.S. 
small businesses are at the losing end of the over-inclusive regulations—
losing market share and profits in the process. 
A simple solution to this problem lies in cooperative information 
sharing and licensing procedures. U.S. companies ought to be allowed to 
submit requests proving that certain items are uncontrolled by various 
other countries around the world. The Secretary of State should then 
respond by having the State Department obtain agreement within a short 
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period from the other countries to control the items they are exporting to 
countries of concern, by removing the item from the CCL, or by creating 
a special licensing system for these items that is much easier than the 
normal export license system. 
C. ITAR Control Effects 
In conjunction with the varying degrees of difficulty that the CCL 
poses for small businesses desiring to export abroad, ITAR poses an even 
stronger limitation, sometimes tying up business for months at a time.120 
Once again, the United States is in the minority when it comes to 
munitions and governmental use controls.121 
Unlike nearly every other nation, the U.S. imposes a requirement that 
it approve re-exports of U.S.-origin items.122 This re-export regulation 
restricts the sale of ITAR-restricted goods, even after they leave the 
United States.123 Most countries implement export protocols that place 
the onus on the recipient country to control the item once the item has 
been shipped.124 In this situation, the United States finds itself, once 
again, in the minority because ITAR and the U.S. government requires 
these controlled goods to be under U.S. jurisdiction for the lifetime of 
any good—termed post-shipment verification.125 This requirement 
applies to shipments or re-exports of the item from the recipient country 
to another and even in-country shipments.126 
Every time the owner of an American-exported good seeks to move 
that good across another country’s border, he or she must first seek 
permission from the U.S. Department of State.127 This regulation can be 
extremely cumbersome for purchasers who desire to re-export or transfer 
the product to another destination, as many companies’ business model 
revolves around middle-man type work. 
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The problem is self-evident. Even if a foreign company decides to 
wait for the lengthy process of U.S. export licensing, it still must comply 
with various U.S. controls. Every time it desires to sell this product, it 
must apply for a re-transport license from the U.S. government and 
inform its future purchaser that it, too, must apply for a license, if he or 
she wished to resell the item.128 Rhetorically, with various simpler 
alternatives at their fingertips, why on earth would a consumer buy a 
U.S. ITAR-controlled good? Here? Here, small businesses once again 
lose valuable market share and business profits abroad as a direct result 
of cumbersome U.S. regulations. 
Equally problematic for U.S. businesses with ITAR-controlled goods 
is the temporal factor. The time it takes129 to apply for an ITAR-
controlled good is vastly more than that of a CCL-controlled good.130 
Similarly, many goods may be simply placed on the ITAR-controlled list 
because one of the company’s customers happens to be the U.S. 
government.131 Anytime the U.S. government is a customer of an item, 
that particular item must be controlled by ITAR.132 Companies may 
lobby to remove their goods from ITAR, but the process can take 
months.133 Compounded with the inter-agency problems described 
above, ITAR classifications pose serious financial problems for small 
businesses exporting abroad.134 
D. Green Technology Challenges 
Alarmingly, another industry that may be harmed by the proliferation 
of export controls in the United States is that of green technology.135 
Green technology, which has become an emerging and fast growing 
industry in recent decades, aids countries in the fight against the harmful 
effects of carbon emissions and global climate change.136 
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Of the total U.S. exports ($1,300.5 billion) in 2008, 5.8 percent ($75 
billion) were green related technologies, and only 0.9 percent ($697.4 
million) of these required an export license.137 The final calculated 
percentage of total exports represented by licensed green technologies 
may be nominal (0.05 percent) but this figure constituted 22.5 percent of 
total licensed exports.138 These figures demonstrate how regulated green 
technologies actually are—representing a hair more than one-twentieth 
of total exports but well over a fifth of total licensed exports. 
Many items used for alternative and green technology require export 
licenses such as: wind turbines, solar panels, alternative fuel resources 
for alternatively fueled vehicles, water purification devices, and energy 
efficiency devices.139 
What does the above say for small businesses trying to compete in 
the green technology market? Many businesses are hindered by the vast 
amount of U.S. export controls on these types of technologies. At the 
same time, while these businesses are filing for export licenses–
especially for ITAR-controlled products categorized as such because of 
existing governmental contracts for those goods or simply inter-agency 
administrative hurdles–they are losing out to their foreign counterparts, 
who are supplying the same products without the hassle of export or re-
export licensing procedures.   
E. Sanctions 
There are three main government entities that focus on the 
enforcement of U.S. government export controls, including: Directorate 
of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS), and the Department of Treasury.140 The Department of Homeland 
Security via Customs and Border Protection, and the Coast Guard, also 
play a large role in the enforcement of export controls by screening 
processes regarding containers and other modes cross-border 
shipment.141 Starting in 2007, the U.S. government drastically increased 
its civil penalties for export control violations by 500% on corporations 
and individuals, from $50,000 to an astounding $250,000.142 
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This Comment contends that the most staggering change is that these 
penalties may be applied retroactively to incidents that occurred before 
2007.143 Some of the more notable sanctions and penalties include: 
$680,000 against Cabela’s Sporting Goods for shipping rifle scopes in 
violation of EAR regulations, $4 million against Lockheed Martin for 
exporting technical data relating to missile defense, and $3 million 
against Boeing for administrative violations.144 It can be argued that for a 
company like Lockheed, which realized 2012 net sales of over $47 
billion, this penalty is a drop in the bucket.145 However, this again 
highlights the main issues affecting small companies while larger 
companies, benefitted also by the ability to better understand the 
licensing process, are also much better financially positioned to handle 
any potential sanctions or penalties. The effects on small businesses 
could be drastic considering the monetary compensation that these 
companies were required to pay. 
F. The Cold Hard Facts 
In a 2013 comprehensive survey by the National Small Business 
Association,146 a large majority of the 500 businesses surveyed can truly 
be deemed as small businesses: fifty-two percent of respondents 
employed nine employees or fewer and seventy percent reported 
spending less than $500,000 on payroll each fiscal year.147 Further, forty-
six percent of the businesses claimed the main barrier to entry to export 
goods arises in that they “don’t know much about it and [are] not sure 
where to start,”148 which logically follows from the fact that fifty-four 
percent of respondents have been exporting for ten or fewer years. 
The most telling numbers, however, were on the import fronts. The 
survey clearly showed that the largest impediments to small businesses 
are domestic export controls, rather than foreign import controls; fully 
sixty-nine percent of companies claimed they had no trouble exporting as 
a result of foreign import regulations.149 
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Lastly, the survey reports that three-quarters of the responding 
businesses reported export control complexity issues, another three-
quarters reported difficulties with time-consumption regarding 
navigating these controls, and fifty-three percent described difficulties as 
a result of dealing with multiple agencies.150 
G. Other Considerations  
Some other potentially damaging and unapparent issues include 
transfers to foreign employees and suppliers’ classification.151 The 
importance of suppliers’ classifications cannot be overstated. Any 
American company that receives goods from overseas and subsequently 
ships fully constructed items incorporating those goods can be liable 
under supplier’s classification failures. In order to ship any product, it 
must be classified on the CCL.152 However, many foreign companies that 
supply goods are not familiar with U.S. export controls, and this 
unfamiliarity may led to grievous errors, such as failure to receive proper 
classifications of the component parts that a company may desire to re-
export.153 
A second damaging issue involves foreign employees. If a company 
supplies information (controlled material) to a foreign employee who is a 
noncitizen or permanent resident of the U.S., that information can be 
deemed an export and, thus, in violation of export controls.154 Each 
business should be familiar with this regulation entitled the “Deemed 
Export Rule.”155 
H. Recommendations 
Because of the issues that vendors and buyers may have with regards 
to classifications, a helpful law could incorporate various export and 
import requirements on the side of the foreign supplier. Given vendors’ 
tendencies to include liability clauses that exclude liability for export 
controls, the supplier or vendor should be required to provide export 
classifications, thus sharing the burden on all the parties involved.156 This 
would also aid and protect small businesses that are relatively new to the 
market and unfamiliar with the vendors’ liability limitation practices. 
                                                                                                             
150 Id. at 13. 
151 Suppliers’ classification refers to the selling party’s description and designation of 
the good. Id. 
152 NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, supra note 52, at 5. 
153 Id. 
154 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii) (2009). 
155 Id. 
156 Joiner, supra note 143. 
2014] EXPORT CONTROL PROLIFERATION 247 
 
This requirement would ensure that suppliers would not only share a 
portion of the liability, but also a quicker and easier license classification 
determination because component suppliers are surely more aware of 
various export controls on their products than final product 
manufacturers, who have less of a gauge on what specific components of 
a total product are regulated. 
The second proposed regulation deals with the Deemed Export Rule. 
Through continued global trade, businesses have employees all over the 
globe. Businesses should not be limited on the information they can 
provide employees solely because said employee is a non-U.S. citizen. A 
possible way around these potential export control violations is an 
employee vetting system. Each company that deals in controlled goods 
should be allowed to submit a list of foreign employees to whom it 
would like to afford access to various controlled material. Similar to an 
export control, the employees could be vetted in a single-streamed 
process, thus reducing the need for multiple and overlapping export 
controls every time a company wishes to provide controlled material to a 
foreign employee. 
VIII. TAKEAWAY 
So what is the takeaway after looking at all of the daunting tasks that 
small businesses are facing? Is there any way that businesses can survive 
in such a regulation-ridden world? The answer is “of course,” and those 
businesses will continue to survive, if not thrive. The key to success, 
which can make a world of difference, is one of knowing and 
understanding the new regulations before they take effect, in addition to 
the old ones currently in place. 
The critical point that small businesses need to understand is how 
each regulation affects their individual business. Trying to understand the 
overall export control framework may be a challenge, but if a company 
can understand their niche, they stand a better chance at compliance. 
That is not to say, however, that the onus is solely on the part of the 
small businesses. As discussed above, agency overlap is a huge problem 
in export control compliance today. Each individual agency should 
understand the areas it is designated to control. Any overlaps should be 
defaulted to the Department of Commerce, considering its relatively 
superior temporal ability in license turnaround with respect to other 
executive departments. Although this may raise security concerns, goods 
on which multiple government entities overlap will likely be items the 
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Department of Defense157 has no need to control in the first place—as 
any weapons material and ITAR-controlled items will automatically go 
to the Defense Department. 
The U.S. government should also incorporate more regulations like 
those implemented on October 15, 2013—using a catch and release 
subparagraph scheme that businesses can easily understand. Regulation 
navigation is also a key concern that should be addressed by future 
legislation. Supplementing the plethora of regulations focused on minor 
specifications with common goods that use each component could make 
a huge difference. Further, requiring foreign exporting companies 
(companies importing components into the United States) to provide 
licensing information to U.S. re-export companies can further reduce the 
burden on small business manufacturers that might otherwise be unaware 
of the particular export restrictions. 
The U.S. government also needs to do modify its re-export license 
requirement for ITAR-controlled goods. This requirement not only 
creates delays in shipping, but also seriously injures businesses selling 
items abroad, as the purchaser in many instances is most likely not the 
end-consumer. The federal government might also reach agreements 
with various trusted countries and allow these countries to control the re-
exportation of certain goods originating from the United States. This 
would allow the U.S. to continue regulating goods to potentially 
dangerous, high-risk countries, without requiring every single item to 
need a re-export license. These agreements with trusted countries would 
also ensure that the original licensing requirements are not affected. 
If each group, small businesses, importers, agencies, and the U.S. 
government, were to work in tandem and make a concentrated effort to 
do their individual parts, the U.S. and small domestic businesses will 
undoubtedly win back their market share on the world-exportation front. 
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